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Relative Income, Redistribution and Well-being
* 
 
In a model with heterogeneous workers and both intensive and extensive margins of 
employment, we consider two systems of redistribution: a universal basic income, and a 
categorical unemployment benefit. Well-being depends on own-consumption relative to 
average employed workers’ consumption, and concern for relativity is a parameter that 
affects model outcomes. While labour supply incurs positive marginal disutility, we allow 
negative welfare effects of unemployment. We also compare Rawlsian and utilitarian welfare 
in general equilibrium under the polar opposite transfer systems, with varying concern for 
relativity. Basic income Pareto dominates categorical benefits with moderate concern for 
relativity in both cases. 
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1. Introduction 
  Evidence on the importance of relative income in subjective well-being (SWB) has 
been  accumulating  rapidly,  as  summarized  in  the  most  comprehensive  study  to-date  by 
Layard et al (2010), or recent reviews by Clark et al (2008), Frey (2008), and Oswald (2009). 
Appropriate reference income has a highly significant, negative effect on well-being similar 
in magnitude to the effect of own income, after controlling for many personal characteristics. 
The  externality  involved  implies  that  redistributive  taxation  is  less  distortionary  than 
otherwise, and that tax rates should rise with concern for relativity
1. Following the early study 
of relative income by Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), subsequent work in this area has also 
usually neglected the participation decision – whether to work or rely on benefits – which 
empirical evidence shows to be most responsive to tax and wage incentives (Immervoll et al, 
2007). 
In  contrast,  most  theoretical  studies  of  redistribution  and  welfare  in  a  general 
equilibrium framework neglect the importance of relative income for well-being, and assume 
a universal lump-sum transfer or basic income for all. This form of transfer has attractive 
theoretical properties (Atkinson, 1995), but is far removed from practical welfare systems. 
These invariably try to target the most needy, such as the unemployed or low-wage workers, 
with categorical benefits that are withdrawn as earnings increase, thus generating often very 
high effective marginal rates of tax, which can create a ‘poverty trap’ or disincentive to work. 
Providing an adequate basic income for all, including the majority who are above the poverty 
level,  has  generally  seemed  to  require  unacceptably  high  rates  of  taxation,  but  recent 
microeconomic simulations show that a basic income can dominate other welfare systems 
under  realistic  assumptions  for  some  countries,  including  low  observed  labour  supply 
                                                
1 These results also help to explain the ‘Easterlin Paradox’ or lack of correlation between long term economic 
growth and changes in average happiness or SWB in advanced economies, in contrast to the positive, short term 
relationship  and  cross-sectional  correlation  between  income  and  SWB  (Easterlin,  1974;  Easterlin  and 
Angelescu, 2009; Layard et al, 2010). Subjective well-being is also strongly correlated with many objective 
indicators of quality of life (Oswald and Wu, 2010).   3 
elasticities for the full time employed, and high participation response (Colombino et al, 
2010). In a model focussing mainly on the participation decision, FitzRoy and Jin (2010) find 
that basic income is generally preferred by a majority to categorical benefits. However these 
models do not explicitly include concern for relative income, which has not yet been widely 
incorporated  into  standard  theories  of  optimal  taxation  and  public  economics  (Kaplow, 
2008)
2. 
Here we follow Layard’s (1980, 2006) call to systematically incorporate the widely 
observed concern for relative income into the public economics of taxation and redistribution. 
We differ from most previous contributions by developing an explicit comparison of the 
welfare consequences  of the two fundamental alternative modes of redistribution –  basic 
income and categorical benefits – in a simple general equilibrium model with heterogeneous 
workers,  including  concern  for  relative  income  and  income  effects,  and  voluntary 
unemployment. We find a surprising Pareto dominance of the basic income system with even 
slight  concern  for  relativity,  and  also  that  optimal  tax  and  unemployment  increase  with 
concern for relativity, under both Rawlsian and utilitarian social objectives. 
These issues are of vital importance as poverty and unemployment increase in the 
aftermath of  recession. In the existing  literature,  there is extensive discussion of welfare 
reform  to  encourage  low  wage  employment  and  remove  poverty  traps,  but  little 
acknowledgement  of  the  role  of  relative  income  in  comparing  welfare  consequences  of 
differing  policy  goals  and  models  of  redistribution,  or  the  potential  of  a  universal  basic 
income.  The  widely  recognised  tendency  for  economic  policy-making  to  lag  behind 
developments in academic economics serves to add to the urgency of the situation. Layard 
                                                
2  Pioneering  exceptions include Oswald  (1983),  and Kanbur  and  Tuomala  (2009),  with  optimal  non-linear 
taxation. Beath and FitzRoy (2009) consider a related model with categorical benefits, a public good, flat taxes 
and a narrower reference income, and hence obtain some different results in this case, but this approach is not 
appropriate for modelling basic income and making the comparisons pursued here. Eaton and Eswaran (2009) 
include a ‘relative consumption externality’ from a Veblen good in a model of homogenous households (without 
redistribution), and a lump-sum tax to fund a public good.   4 
(2005, 2006, 2009), Oswald (2009), Stiglitz et al (2010), and many others have emphasised 
the need for policy to focus on the goal of happiness or subjective well-being, rather than 
exclusive  concern  with  average  GDP  (growth). In  so-doing,  important  issues to  consider 
include relative income, basic income to avoid the ‘poverty trap’, taxation as an instrument to 
discourage excessive effort, redistribution and social interactions. 
For tractability, we restrict attention to linear or flat taxes, which may be a reasonable 
approximation to optimal taxes. Thus Mankiw et al (2009, p. 2) suggest that “ A flat tax, with 
a universal lump-sum transfer, could be close to optimal”, although Colombino et al (2010) 
do find welfare gains from progressive taxes, using empirically-supported low labour supply 
elasticities  for  full  time  employees,  in  contrast  to  much  previous  literature  on  optimal 
taxation. The latter generally finds high marginal rates on low earners to be optimal, to ‘phase 
out’  a  universal  transfer,  followed  by  lower  rates  on  higher  earners  to  encourage  labour 
supply.  The  withdrawal  of  categorical  benefits  for  full-time  workers  thus  appears  to 
approximate  at  least  part  of  the  optimal  tax  schedule,  though  there  are  also  important 
differences (Kaplow, 2008). 
 The plan of the paper is to develop the benchmark general equilibrium model with a 
universal  basic  income  in  section  2,  and  corresponding  results  with  categorical 
unemployment  benefits  in  section  3.  Most  comparisons  between  the  two  systems  and 
dependence on optimally chosen parameters cannot be obtained analytically, so we present 
the results of extensive numerical simulations of the main relationships (including the plots 




2. A model with universal basic income   5 
Assume a continuous distribution of productivity or wages, denoted  [ ] 0,1 wÎ , with 
distribution  ( ), F w   density  ( ) f w ,  and  (1) 1 F = .  (We  could  allow  a  positive  measure  of 
individuals with zero productivity who are thus essentially disabled or unable to work, but 
our focus is on voluntary unemployment, or the participation decision). Individual effort or 
labour supply is x, and utility or subjective well-being is quasi-linear in leisure, with constant 
elasticity  of  relative  consumption,  so  for  the  employed  and  unemployed  we  have 
respectively: 
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Here,  0, 1 g g > ¹ , (and  1 g -  is the elasticity of labour supply in the standard case, 
when B=0), t is the tax rate on earnings, B>0 is basic income, an unconditional transfer 
received by all, wx is output with linear technology, equal to earnings,  ( ) 1 wx t B - +  is total 
net income of the employed, which is consumed, and  y is the reference income, defined 
simply  as  mean  net  income  of  all  employed  households,  below.  Finally,  [ ] 0,1 b Î   is  the 
degree of concern for relative income, with  0 b =  the traditional case when only absolute 
income is considered. As discussed in the introduction, there is growing evidence for the 
importance of relative income, but of course our simple model omits many other factors that 
affect well-being. (Our results suggest that ￿ too close to one is unrealistic, while exceeding 
one does not make sense theoretically). 
The  FOC  for  (1)  now  gives  labour  supply,  say  ˆ x,  and  after-tax  income  or 
consumption, say Y, according to    6 
2.  ( ) 1
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The positive basic income means that households with some positive marginal wage, 
say m, will supply zero effort, and these and all other households with lower wages will be 
voluntarily unemployed. Thus m is the effective minimum wage for employment, or strictly, 
the lower bound, and from (2) it is given by 
3. 
( ) 1 (1 ) m t By
b g g g - - =  
 
The number (or share) of the unemployed is thus F(m). Now using (2) and (3) we can 
define mean, net income (or consumption) of the employed as follows: 
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So we have average income as a function of m and t: 
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g º￿  and  ( ) ( ) G m m f m
g ¢ = - . 
Next, the government budget is defined by equating tax revenue with redistributive 
expenditure on the basic income for the unit population, so we obtain benefits as a function of 
m and t, say 
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Using (2) yields 
7.  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Next we incorporate the incentive-compatibility condition (3) for the marginal wage. 
Then it is convenient to consider this minimum employment wage as the policy variable, and   7 
derive the equilibrium tax rate, say  ( ) ˆ t m  , consistent with a given, incentive compatible 
choice of minimum wage and the balanced-budget level of basic income by substituting for B 
from (3) to give 









It is easy to verify that this is an increasing function of m, and a decreasing function of ￿, and 
so could be inverted to give the minimum wage as an implicit function of the tax. It is thus 
convenient to consider the minimum wage as the government’s policy instrument. 
Now we can find general equilibrium mean, net income (or consumption), and basic 
income, defined in the obvious way when the equilibrium tax is substituted into (5) and (7), 
as functions of the minimum wage. From these two equations we get 
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and from (3),  
10.                                             ( ) ( ) 1









Notice that this has the same form as (3), but now we have substituted the equilibrium tax and 
average income.  
Then  we  can  obtain  the  equilibrium  individual  income,  effort  and  utility  of  the 
employed and unemployed respectively as functions of the policy instrument, m, and the 
individual wage, using (8) and (9)  
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11.   8 
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We summarize the main conclusions from these expressions as  
Proposition 1: 
For given m, individual labour supply in general equilibrium increases with the wage (though 
not necessarily when ￿ < 1, a case we do not consider further), as does the well-being of the 
employed, ( which corresponds to empirical findings). For given m and w,  equilibrium mean 
income and individual effort increase with concern for relativity.      
          Intuitively, increasing concern means that other individuals’ greater effort creates a 
larger  externality,  which  in  turn  generates  more  offsetting  effort  by  raising  the  marginal 
return  to  effort.  In  the  traditional  case  of  zero  concern  for  relative  income,  we  see  that 
benefits  first  increase  and  then  decline  with  unemployment  or  the  minimum  wage  in  a 
standard Laffer curve. If m is small, the wage elasticity of labour supply for those in work is 
approximately   ￿ – 1, which empirical evidence suggests is small for full-time workers. The 
general case is too complicated for analytical solution. 
 
3. Categorical benefits 
A basic income to replace other benefits has not yet been introduced in practice, and 
redistribution mainly targets the unemployed and the lowest paid workers. We explore this 
alternative in the simplest way by assuming a fixed transfer for the non-employed, which is 
lost  when  any  labour  is  supplied,  thus  imposing  a  high  marginal  tax  rate  on  low  wage 
workers  who  are  just  above  effective  minimum  wage,  and  hence  only  slightly  better  off 
working.  While  this  neglects  the  complications  of  ‘tapered’  withdrawal  of  transfers  as 
earnings  increase,  it  captures  (in  a  tractable  approximation)  the  basic  feature  of  existing 
welfare systems, that most of the employed do not receive transfers, and is closer to reality   9 
than the universal basic income which is widely used in theoretical models. We thus drop 
benefits in the utility of the employed in (1) and from the FOCs obtain labour supply, say 












Note that this yields the same after-tax earnings,  ( ) 1 wx t
* - , as with basic income in (2), for a 
given  reference  income.  Clearly,  1 g <   implies  backward-bending  labour  supply,  the  less 
plausible case because work time and earnings are strongly correlated in cross-section. Utility 
from work at this wage and optimal labour supply is then: 















The unemployed have utility from consumption of unemployment benefits, here denoted by 


















The parameter  ( ] 0,1 d Î  represents the loss of welfare from being unemployed, in addition to 
income loss, which is found in numerous surveys. While voluntary unemployment or non-
employment  in  our  simple  model  might  be  considered  to  be  less  debilitating  than  more 
realistic involuntary unemployment, it remains a signal of dependency and inability to supply 
labour that can earn an adequate wage. At least some ‘involuntary’ unemployment might be 
considered voluntary when benefits are preferred to available (poor) wages and conditions. 
By contrast, the universal basic income considered above is entirely non-discriminatory, and 
the participation decision in this case need not necessarily signal lack of ability to outside 
observers, but rather a choice between extra consumption or unpaid activity, more akin to 
other consumer choices. Furthermore, labour supply approaches zero for wages close to the   10 
minimum wage with basic income, so there is a seamless transition where the difference 
between employment and unemployment becomes negligible, whereas the categorical benefit 
induces a discontinuity – minimum labour supply has to be large enough to just compensate 
for loss of the benefit. 
Now to obtain the marginal wage, m, we equate this unemployment utility with utility 
from work at wage m, so from (13) and (14) we get a similar expression to (3): 
15.  ( ) ( )
( ) 1
1 1 m t y C
g
g b g g g gd
-
- - =  
Mean income of the employed is given by (5) above, and we use the budget condition to 
define the benefit, C, received only by the unemployed, from (12) as 
16.  ( )
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Now  we  can  substitute  for  C  from  (15)  to  eliminate  mean  earnings  and  get  the  new 
equilibrium tax: 
17.  ( ) ( )











Here we write ( ) 1
g
g e gd - º  for simplicity. Comparing with the corresponding tax in the basic 
income case, (8), with given minimum wage and unemployment, we summarize results in the 
following:  
Proposition 2: 
(a)  ( ) ( ) ˆ , , , t m t m g d g
* <  when  1 gd > , because then  1 e > . 
(b) However if  1 gd <  while  1 g >  still holds, then  1 e < , the tax inequality is reversed, 
and  ( ) ( ) ˆ , , , t m t m g d g
* > . 
(c)  If  1 g < , then  1 e > , and we are back to the first case with a lower tax for categorical 
benefits.   11 
Equilibrium mean earnings are found in the same way as in (9), but now with the different 
equilibrium tax which can generate higher or lower mean earnings: 
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Substituting (18) and equilibrium tax (17) into the FOC for individual labour supply (12) 
gives general equilibrium labour supply as a function of m and w. Comparing (18) with (9) 
we see that only the tax differs between these expressions. From (15) we have equilibrium 
benefits for the unemployed 












When the marginal wage and unemployment are small, the lower tax will provide higher 
consumption than with basic income, unless g  is very large, as might be expected. 

































Substituting (18) into (19) and using (20) and (21) yields general equilibrium well-being of 
the unemployed, (where we suppress dependence on concern for relativity): 





























* *  
Similarly, from (9) – (11) we can write general equilibrium utility of the unemployed with a 
basic income as:   12 
23.    ( ) ( )





























The  similarity  between  these  two  expressions,  under  quite  different  welfare  systems,  is 
remarkable. We summarize results for two ‘extreme’ cases: 
Proposition 3: 
(a) When  1 b = , welfare is independent of the tax rate, and the unemployed are always 
better off with basic income when  1 g > , for all m. 
(b) When m is small the difference between the tax terms will generally also be small, 
and then large g  implies that the unemployed are better off with basic income. 
However, these results do not tell us anything about welfare when the minimum wage, and 
hence unemployment, are chosen optimally under the respective benefit systems, in the more 
plausible case for the present simple model when  1 b < . These comparisons are analytically 
intractable, so to obtain further insight we use numerical simulations. 
 
4. Simulations 
  These simulations, under a variety of parameter settings, allow the main results to be 
presented graphically. Our initial focus will be on the Rawlsian case, maximising utility for 
unemployed individuals, but we also consider the utilitarian case
3. We will explore whether 
the optimal BI is preferable to the optimal CB, and how this comparison varies with the type 
of social welfare function chosen and with variation in the importance of relative income. Of 
course, our simulations also provide evidence on the performance of the two welfare systems 
in the traditional case where there is no concern for relativity. 
                                                
3 These are the two commonly considered polar cases of maximal redistribution under the Rawlsian or maximin 
goal, and no redistribution beyond what is generated by decreasing marginal utility of consumption under the 
utilitarian objective of maximizing aggregate welfare.   13 
  We use the convenient beta distribution of wages and can consider different parameter 
values  to  vary  skewness  of  the  wage  distribution.  Realistically,  the  wage  distribution  is 
positively  skewed  (the  right-hand  tail  representing  the  modest  proportion  of  workers 
receiving very high wages). Although we also consider variations in the wage distribution 
(including the example of a symmetric wage distribution), the results are essentially similar – 
and so we do not report them here in detail. However, optimal choices made under a less 
skewed income distribution allow a higher effective minimum wage, lower unemployment 
rate and lower tax rate. Since this does not change with the level of concern for relative 
income, or with the choice of a BI system in place of CB, it can be seen as providing new 
support for reducing an aspect of income inequality. 
  The elasticity of labour supply has been much studied, with a wide range of results – 
depending on methodology used and which sub-group of the workforce is being analysed. 
However, in a meta analysis of more than 200 empirical labour supply elasticities from the 
literature, Evers  et  al  (2008) found that  a labour supply  elasticity of 0.1 was typical for 
(predominantly full-time) male workers, while the labour supply of (often part-time) female 
workers tended to be more elastic (around 0.5). For our simulations, we use ￿ = 1.5 (labour 
supply elasticity of 0.5 under CB) as standard. However, unreported results demonstrate that 
there is little substantive impact of choosing quite a wide range of alternatives, such as ￿ = 1.1 
or ￿ = 2.0 (unit elasticity under CB). Our simple model uses the same elasticity for the whole 
labour  force,  including  very  low  wage  workers  who  are  likely  to  be  marginal  for  some 
benefit-tax  combinations,  and  responsive  to  policy  change,  and  our  choice  represents  a 
compromise with little effect on qualitative results.  
Optimal utility under BI can only be compared meaningfully to its counterpart under 
CB for a given value of ￿ (each particular type of preference is defined by degree of concern 
for relativity). All the figures below, (apart from Figure 3), are generated for the case of a   14 
skewed wage distribution, ￿ = 1.5 (indicating modestly inelastic labour supply), and ￿ = 1 (so 
that no stigma is attached to unemployment under CB). Figures 1-9 each consider a range of 
values from zero to 0.9 for ￿ (indicating the importance of relative income). Since the model 
is stylized for simplicity and neglects many important determinants of well-being, values of ￿ 
cannot be compared directly with empirical findings on the weight of relative income in 
happiness regressions. While values close to one are implausible, the middle range seems to 
give ‘reasonable’ results, and the traditional case of no concern for relativity is certainly not 
supported by empirical studies, as discussed in the introduction. 
In Figure 1, the optimal utility of the unemployed is plotted against ￿, and shows that 
CB gives more utility to the unemployed only for very low values of ￿ (up to about 0.1). This 
is a somewhat surprising result, because the CB specifically targets the unemployed, yet it 
takes only a slight concern for relativity for BI to dominate, without higher unemployment. 
(With some realistic unemployment stigma under the CB system (via ￿ = 0.75), BI always 
yields higher utility for the unemployed).  
Figure 1: Optimal values of unemployment utility plotted against ￿ for unemployment utility 
BI (red line), and CB (blue dashed line). 
   15 
 
Figure  2 shows the optimal tax against ￿  for the same  combination of parameter 
values as in Figure 1. Since ￿￿ > 1, Proposition 1 shows the optimal tax to be higher in the BI 
case, whatever the value of ￿. This is confirmed by Figure 2. However, we should note that 
the optimal level of the effective minimum wage differs across the two benefit systems (and 
also varies with ￿). 
 





To investigate the second part of Proposition 1, we note that a change to ￿ = 0.75 reduces the 
tax difference. If we then consider the case of ￿ = 1.1 (holding ￿ = 0.75), we can see from 
Figure 3 that the optimal tax rate is not always higher under BI. In fact, the two lines plotted 
in Figure 3 cross, with BI yielding a higher optimal tax only for lower values of ￿ (up to 
about 0.55), and a lower optimal tax when ￿ is larger. Although this may initially appear at 
odds with Proposition 1, in fact it is not. In Figure 3, we are comparing t*(￿,￿,m*) with   16 
t￿(￿,￿￿), or incorporating the optimal minimum wage under the two benefit systems, rather 




Figure 3: Optimal values of the tax rate plotted against ￿ under BI (red line), and CB (blue 
dashed line) with ￿ = 1.1, and ￿ = 0.75 to capture unemployment stigma in the CB case. 
 
 
   17 
Figures 4-7 are related. In Figure 4, optimal BI and CB for the Rawlsian case are 












Figure 4: Optimally chosen BI and CB (vertical axis) against ￿, Rawlsian case. 
 
 
Figure 5 makes a similar comparison for the utilitarian objective and finds that the plots in 
this case cross twice, so that optimal BI is higher for mid-range values of ￿. Again this is far 
from obvious, and the ‘inefficiency’ of the CB, which delivers less well-being in spite of its 






















Figure 5: Optimally chosen BI and categorical benefit (vertical axis) against ￿ (horizontal 




Figure 6 shows how optimally-chosen BI varies as ￿ increases, for our two objectives. 
When ￿ = 0, so that relative income is irrelevant, the Rawlsian objective gives a higher 
optimal BI than the utilitarian (by  19%), as  expected. As  ￿ is increased, the optimal BI 
initially  rises  in  both  cases.  However,  the  rise  is  –  rather  surprisingly  –  steeper  for  the   19 
utilitarian case, so the two lines cross at about ￿ = 0.27. In both cases, optimal BI peaks
4 in 
the range [0.45,0.54] for ￿. Furthermore, optimal BI under both objectives then declines with 
still higher concern, converging to the same low level for ￿ = 0.9. Intuitively, there are two 
opposing effects of the increasing externality from higher concern for relativity. Initially a 
higher  tax  reduces  socially  excessive  labour  supply,  generating  greater  BI  and  higher 
unemployment, but for large ￿ the shrinking tax base and revenues (shown below) combine 
to yield lower optimal BI. 
 




Figure 7 shows how the optimally chosen CB varies with ￿. When ￿ = 0, so that 
relative income is irrelevant, the Rawlsian case gives a higher optimal CB than the utilitarian 
case (this result parallels our earlier finding for BI). As ￿ is increased, the optimal benefit 
initially rises in both cases. However, the rise is a little steeper for the utilitarian case, so the 
                                                
4 Figure 6 reveals variations in optimal BI over ￿ which are quite substantial though non-monotonic.   20 
two lines cross at about ￿ = 0.45. Optimal CB peaks
5 around ￿ = 0.54 in the Rawlsian case, 















Figure 8 shows how all the optimal tax rates increase with ￿ as expected, essentially 
to  offset  the  increasing  externality  imposed  by  own  earnings  on  others  as  concern  for 
relativity rises. Equally intuitively, optimal tax with BI is generally greater than optimal tax 
with CB, whatever the social objective. Most interestingly, however, optimal Rawlsian and 
                                                
5 Figure 7 shows variations in optimal CB over ￿ which are less substantial than those for optimal BI.   21 
utilitarian taxes converge for high ￿, (remaining higher for BI than for CB). Intuitively, the 
growing weight of the externality in individual utility comes to dominate the differing social 
objectives, for high enough concern for relativity. However the high taxes for high ￿ are 
rather implausible, suggesting that the middle of the range is more realistic. 
As will be indicated in Figures 10-12, the behaviour of the optimal effective minimum 
wage (and corresponding non-employment) – as ￿ is increased from zero – parallel that of the 
optimal tax rate, by rising with increasing concern for relative income and by being higher in 
the Rawlsian case than the utilitarian case
6. However, the optimal effective minimum wage 
and non-employment are both lower for a BI system than for a CB, as expected. 




Figure  9  demonstrates  how  total  (optimal)  tax  revenue,  and  hence  ‘size  of 
government’ varies with ￿. In terms of the public finances, we expect an optimal BI system to 
                                                
6 Again (for both the minimum wage and the unemployment rate), this gap diminishes as ￿ rises under a basic 
income; but not under a categorical benefit until mid-range values of ￿ are reached.   22 
be  more  expensive  than  a corresponding  CB  system.  Though  more  tax  revenue must  be 
collected  under  a  Rawlsian  (rather  than  utilitarian)  objective
7  when  relative  income  is 
unimportant, this inequality reverses – as soon as ￿ reaches about 0.3 in the case of a BI, but 
only when ￿ approaches 0.7 for a CB. 
 
 




Figure 10 considers the utilitarian objective. We show how aggregate utility varies 
with the effective minimum wage, m, for three chosen values of ￿ – zero (no concern for 
relative income), 0.45 (intermediate) and 0.9 (very high). For each value of ￿, we consider 
both BI and CB. Under BI, the optimal effective minimum wage (and thus the unemployment 
rate) increases with concern for relative income. With CB the initially fairly flat utility plot 
                                                
7 A higher effective minimum wage and higher tax rate both tend to reduce mean income, outweighing the 
opposite  effect  of  a  lower  employment  rate.  In  spite  of  also  having  lower  employment  to  tax,  the  higher 
Rawlsian tax rate is initially sufficient to allow more tax revenue to be collected than in the utilitarian case.   23 
means that an optimal minimum wage is difficult to identify, which is why we do not follow 
the presentation of the Rawlsian results in Figure 1. There are several interesting conclusions 
from Figure 10. With no concern for relativity, BI and CB yield approximately optimal and 
equal utilitarian welfare over an initial range of (low) minimum wages, though BI-well-being 
then falls rapidly below CB-well-being as m rises. For realistic intermediate (and also high) ￿, 
BI dominates CB by an increasingly wide margin. With BI, optimal unemployment is much 
lower than with CB (although the gap narrows for high ￿). 




This yields a tentative possible explanation for the view that BI is not an efficient 
transfer system. With traditional neglect of concern for relativity in policy making, and a 
‘political’ minimum wage above the equivalent of 0.2 in Figure 10, the steep decline of BI 
welfare for perceived ￿ = 0 appears to support CB. Yet with realistic concern for relativity, 
the welfare comparison is dramatically reversed. 
(1) b = 0.00 
(2) b = 0.00 
(1) b = 0.45  
(2) b = 0.45 
(1) b = 0.90  
(2) b = 0.90  
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For good reasons, we have concentrated so far on measures of social welfare, and the 
corresponding  values  taken  by  the  minimum  wage,  unemployment,  tax  rate  and  the 
government  budget.  However,  underlying  this  is  a  heterogeneous  population  of  potential 
workers. Figures 11 and 12 offer some illustration of which individuals (within the ability 
distribution)  tend  to  benefit  more  under  the  various  policies  and  preferences  we  have 
considered. A black vertical line in each figure shows the halfway point in the population – at 
a wage level of just above 0.3, because of the negative skewness of the wage distribution. In 
Figure 11, Rawlsian policy leaves unemployed individuals (shown by the horizontal sections 
on the left) slightly better off under CB than BI when relative income is considered irrelevant. 
However, a CB leaves more individuals (over half of the population) without a job – such 
that the highest ability unemployed and the lowest paid working poor are better off with BI, 
when  more  people  would  work.  Nonetheless,  Figure  11  also  shows  that  high  ability 
individuals prefer the CB system because of the lower tax when ￿ =  0. However, when 
relative  income  has  even  moderate  importance  (￿  =  0.36),  all  individuals  prefer  the  BI 
system, regardless of their ability. 
Figure 11: Individual utility (vertical axis) against wage rate or implied ability (horizontal 
axis) in the Rawlsian case. 
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Figure 12 displays very similar results under a utilitarian social objective, while also 
showing  higher  employment  rates  (compared  to  each  counterpart  from  Figure  11). 
Remarkably, well-being of the unemployed is almost the same under Rawlsian and utilitarian 
BI, and substantially lower in each case with CB. Furthermore, when ￿ = 0, more mid-range 
ability individuals prefer the BI system over CB than with a Rawlsian objective. Clearly, 
there will be an intermediate value of ￿ above which a majority of the population will prefer 
BI, for each objective. 
Figure 12: Individual utility (vertical axis) against wage rate or implied ability (horizontal 
axis) in the utilitarian case. 
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As noted in Section 2, optimal individual effort under a BI increases with concern for 
relative income (￿) for a given effective minimum wage (m) and wage (w), and also rises 
with w. Figure 13 shows how optimal effort, now using optimal m, increases with the wage –
in the Rawlsian case with BI. Lower unemployment evident in Figure 11 for ￿ = 0 is reflected 
in positive optimal effort at a lower wage than when ￿ = 0.36. At wages up to about 0.5 
(more than half of the population, given the skewness of the wage distribution), optimal effort 
is higher for lower ￿, (with the optimal minimum wage). This is a surprising result, because 
we have seen that, for given m, optimal effort rises with ￿ , so it due to the offsetting effect of 
the  increasing  optimal  minimum  wage.  The  two  upper  plots  with  CB  show  greater 
unemployment than with BI, and higher effort for all workers with higher ￿, as expected. 
Under the lower CB tax (Fig.2), effort is always higher than corresponding BI effort. 
 
Figure 13: Optimal values of effort (with optimal m) plotted against w for the Rawlsian case 
under a BI for ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0.36. 
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  Following equation (11), we also noted that equilibrium mean income under a BI also 
increases with ￿, again for given m. Figure 14, below, demonstrates that – if the optimal 
minimum wage is used – mean income under a BI initially rises slightly with ￿, but then falls 
back for moderate and high concern for relativity as tax continues to rise. Further, mean 
income under a CB (with a similar path) is much higher than with BI, for any given ￿. This 
difference is enhanced by there being fewer low earners and more unemployment. The higher 







Figure 14: Optimal mean income (vertical axis) plotted against ￿ (horizontal axis) for BI (red 






We have constructed a model which allows basic income (BI) and categorical benefit 
(CB)  to  be  compared  in  a  simple  general  equilibrium  model  –  combining  worker 
heterogeneity, extensive and intensive margins of labour supply, as well as including concern 
for relative  income,  and declining marginal utility of own consumption. Our simulations 
compare Rawlsian and utilitarian policy under these two fundamentally different systems of 
redistribution,  yielding  interesting  and  surprising  results  that  could  not  be  derived 
analytically. A major surprise is that modest concern for relativity implies Pareto dominance 
of BI, (in spite of associated higher tax), when compared to CB (with higher unemployment, 
and effort by the employed), under both Rawlsian and utilitarian goals. Another surprise 
under moderate relativity concern is that the two radically different policy objectives provide 
essentially the same utility to the non-employed, though high earners benefit from the lower   29 
utilitarian  tax.  (In  the  traditional  case  of  no  concern  for  relativity,  the  rich  and  most 
unemployed do prefer CB). While the levels of optimal BI and CB initially rise with concern 
for relativity, they then decline, though optimal unemployment, taxes and minimum wages all 
increase monotonically, with higher tax and lower individual effort and unemployment under 
BI as expected. While optimal unemployment levels appear high, they can be interpreted as 
‘non-employment’  in  a  total  population  which  includes  individuals  with  arbitrarily  low 
productivities who would not normally be included in the labour force. 
These simulations have not generally included the realistic stigma or utility loss from 
unemployment under CB, which was included in our model. This would clearly enhance the 
relative  advantage  of  BI,  and  we  presented  one  example  with  stigma where  the  optimal 
Rawlsian tax becomes higher with CB than for BI when concern for relativity is important. 
Overall,  we  have  found  a  remarkable  dominance  of  BI  when  relative  income  is 
important  for  individual  well-being,  as  well  as  much  less  difference  in  the  outcomes  of 
Rawlsian  and  utilitarian  policies  than  expected.  Many  important  aspects  of  BI,  and 
determinants  of  SWB,  that  have  been  discussed  in  the  literature are  neglected  here,  and 
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